Rotating Chaos

There is stillness, there is chaos, and there is a chaos that rotates as well, within this chaos, there is stillness. Grab the stillness when you can and sit with it, when you see the chaos coming, put your best foot forward. When it begins to rotate, be prepared to surf it back to the stillness

Saturday, July 18, 2009

THEORY OF MIND, THE CORPUS COLLOSUM, AUTISIM AND ASPERGERS w/ a smidge o' KIM PEEK

KIM PEEK


Steven Wiltshire
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckqDX2XpdyY&feature=related

A. What Causes Autism?

No one really knows what causes autism, but it is suspected there may be many causes or combinations of causes.

We now suspect, thanks to modern techniques of brain-scanning, that the difference in an autistic's brain lies in the structure at the centre of the brain called the amygdala. One important job of the amygdala is to interpret facial expressions and non-verbal communication. Recent research has shown that whilst the amgydala appears normal in most brain scans (such as MRIs), there are specialist 3-D scans which reveal it is flatter in ACs.

Also, in the frontal lobes there is an area known as the "social brain" which is involved in the understanding and interpretation of "social rules" and understanding Theory of Mind (see Issues: Theory of Mind). The social brain contains specialised cells called Purkinje neurons. These cells are apparently scarcer in AC brains than NT brains.

Many people believe that autistics are generally born autistic, they do not become that way. In fact, DSM-IV states that symptoms must have been present before 3 years old, for a diagnosis. Others believe that autism can be acquired later on.

In the bad old days, autism was thought to be caused by cold and distant mothers who had inadequately bonded with their babies, the so-called "Refridgerator Mother Syndrome". Although the term was first coined by Kanner (who later recanted of the theory), it will be forever associated with it's main proponent, Bruno Bettelheim (from book "The Empty Fortress". For another view, see his biography "The Creation of Dr.B" by Richard Pollak).

Believing in this theory, Bettelheim promoted a treatment centred around giving psychotherapy to parents, in an attempt to help them "bond" with these children. It didn't work, but unfortunately, the Refridgerator Mother theory refuses to die. Hardly a year goes by when we don't see it rear it's ugly head again. Even today, there are centres in the world who "treat" autism by counselling the parents; and there are still psychiatrists and psychologists who would happily blame the parents for their child's disability.

In reality, there is a considerable amount of evidence that genetic factors may play a part, since ASDs often seem to run in families.

Other factors that have been blamed include:

  • Viral infections in the womb
  • Drugs used in pregnancy and/or childbirth
  • Birth injury
  • Environmental toxins
  • Vaccines
  • Measles (either the virus or the vaccination against it)
  • Food intolerances or allergies
  • Chronic yeast infections
  • Infections like meningitis
  • Mercury poisoning

It is likely that some children may be affected by some of these factors, or combinations of factors, but as yet, researchers have been unable to pinpoint a single cause, or group of causes that would explain all or most ASDs. However, there are some researchers who are very evangelical about their particular theories. Time will tell if they are on the right track.

Research is continuing, but in the meantime, it is important that parents avoid the temptation to blame themselves and obsess about everything they may have ever done that wasn't optimal.


B. The Infamous Cure Debate

There is currently no cure for ASDs, so why the debate? And why "infamous"? Intermittently on a.s.a., someone brings up the subject: "What if there was a cure for ASDs?

Not a treatment for unpleasant symptoms, not relief from discomforts, but a permanant, irreversible cure for whatever it is in the brain of a person, that causes them to be autistic.

The first aspect to the debate is the meaning of the word "cure", which some would see as relief from discomfort and psychological pain; and others would see as completely transforming the AC to be NT. Generally, the people who are opposed to a "cure" are those who would see it in absolute terms, as the total removal of the differences that make a person fit under the diagnostic criteria as "ASD". Those in favour often use the word interchangably with the word "treatment".

Invariably, a huge debate is generated. There are two main "sides" to this debate:

  1. Those who feel that their ASD is an intrinsic part of who they are. Remove the ASD, you remove their personality, and they cease to exist. This group see "cure" as a kind of death.
  2. Those who feel that the person is still the same person without the ASD, and that since the ASD causes suffering, it should be removed, should that ever become possible. Or, that the AC would not be quite the same person without the ASD, but changing personality, when your life is full of suffering, isn't much of a loss.

The former group believe that it is not ASDs themselves that cause suffering, but society's treatment of ACs and associated mental illnesses (such as OCD) which could be treated without changing the personality. The latter group believe that it the ASD itself that causes the suffering, and that relieving suffering is their principal goal (and of course, there are a lot of people in the middle who believe that ASDs cause suffering, but still don't want to be cured.)

In past debates, the former group have accused the latter of believing in a kind of euthanasia; and the latter have accused the former of wishing to perpetuate suffering. Since both positions were supported by ACs, with tendancies towards rigid thinking and explosive tempers, the debate quickly became ugly.

As ever on a.s.a., it was all forgotten quickly, but if you dare to mention the word "cure", be warned. It could all start up again!


Theory of Mind

Theory of Mind is a topic that comes up regularly on a.s.a., frequently leading to complex philosophical debates.

Contents:

  1. Definition
  2. The Sally-Ann Test
  3. Becky and the Plant Sprayer

1. Definition

The meaning of the term is very difficult, but my understanding is that it refers to the innate ability of one person to sense the state of mind of another (a kind of empathy, in a way); and to be able to see the world through another person's eyes, another person's point of view. If you have T.O.M., you will instinctively understand that just because you know something, it doesn't mean that I know it too. It is as if people who lack T.O.M. assume others are telepathic, and explains why some ACs often open with statements that seem to come from the middle of a conversation, not the beginning, not giving all the necessary background to ascertain the context.

The debate generally centres around the belief that ACs invariably lack T.O.M. Does T.O.M. even exist? Is it perhaps a learned behaviour for everyone that ACs aren't so good at? Is it just psycho-babble?

Return to Top

2. The Sally-Ann Test

The Sally-Ann test is a famous test used to judge whether a person has T.O.M. or not, and the test itself probably explains what T.O.M is, better than I can. Children are supposed to be able to do this test by around 6-8 years old.

The procedure goes thus:

You introduce the child to two dolls, Sally and Ann, and show the child that each doll has her own box, with a marble hidden inside. Then you tell the child that Sally is going out for a minute, and remove the doll from the scene, leaving her box behind.

Next, you tell the child that Ann is going to play a trick on Sally: she opens Sally's box, removes the marble, hiding it in her own box. Sally returns, unaware of what happened and you ask the child where Sally would look for her marble.

A child with Theory of Mind will realise that Sally doesn't know that Ann has played a trick on her, and will therefore look in her own box for her marble, and discover it missing. But a child lacking in Theory of Mind will only see the situation from her own point of view, and suggest that Sally look for the marble where it actually is: in Ann's box.

Very small children will not be able to guess correctly in this test, since Theory of Mind takes time to develop, but most children should be able to do the test by 6 or 7 years old at the latest and some as young as three years old can. However, it is thought that most children with ASDs will not be able to complete the test, and many AC adults cannot.

But, this test should not be taken as an infallible test for ASDs. Some intelligent ACs can do the test simply by logical deduction, without truly having this mysterious ability of "Theory of Mind". Most people of low intelligence will not be able to do the test, even though they may be otherwise very sociable, such as people with Down's Syndrome. People with another disability, William's Syndrome are exceptional in their ability to do this test, despite apparently low, functional intelligence.

So, whilst this test may be interesting, it doesn't necessarily tell us anything we couldn't tell by observation. But you are welcome to your own opinions - this discussion is one which will run and run!


The Tale of Becky and the Plant Sprayer
A Story about Theory of Mind

One of the members of our newsgroup went to a conference and heard a lady called Carol Gray speak. Carol Gray is the woman famous for developing a technique known as "Social Stories" for helping autistic people learn about social behaviour, based on the ancient idea of telling illustrative stories.

But Carol Gray didn't always believe in such benign methods - for many years, she was trained in the old Behaviourism methods. It was her interactions with autistic people themselves that lead to her questioning what she had been taught and eventually lead to the development of her "Social Stories" methodology.

This is how her annecdote was reported by our group member, a parent of an autistic child:

Carol told us this one story she told about a girl called Becky. She told it to illustrate how what many of us NT's take for granted as 'unspoken' knowledge needs to sometimes to be spelt out to our AC children.

One of Carol's first students was a non-verbal girl called Becky. Carol never believed she would be capable of mainstream schooling or speech. Becky's eye contact was non-existent, so (Carol claims this to be the first of the many mistakes she made in teaching AC children) she half filled a spray bottle (like the ones used for misting plants)

Whilst working one-to-one with her she would spray orange juice into her mouth whenever her eyes passed hers.

Anyway years went by and Becky improved dramatically and went to school. Carol still saw her regularly and promised her a charm for her charm bracelet for each year she completed. Carol very happily announced that they are now on their second charm bracelet.

Every year before xmas they would meet for lunch and exchange gifts. Becky never in all the years they met ever mentioned the fact that Carol had once been her teacher. Until this one xmas lunch when she out of the blue said "There's been something I have been meaning to ask you for a long time. You were my teacher once weren't you?"

Carol thought OK here comes. "Yes, Becky, I was."

[Incidentally Becky's eye contact never improved. In fact Carol once asked her if Becky knew what Carol looked like, she said "Yes, I look at you when your not looking."]

Becky then asked "Why did you squirt me in the mouth?"

Carol tried to explain that because of her lack of eye contact she was using it as a means to increase this. Becky who was sitting in a booth at the restaurant they had chosen for lunch began to laugh hysterically, so much so she actually fell sideways, bobbing up every so often before disappearing again.

Carol frantically tried to explain that she meant no harm and she was just trying to improve her eye contact...

Eventually Becky calmed down and said to carol "Do you know what I thought!!?"

"NO"

"I thought you thought I was a plant!!"

You see in Becky's mind she actually thought that it was possible for Carol not to realise that she was indeed a person, not a plant. Why? Because no one had ever told her that Carol knew the difference between plants and people! Becky lacked Theory of Mind; she lacked the ability to imagine what was likely to be in Carol's mind. Therefore, what is obvious to many (that people generally don't mistake children for plants) was not obvious to her.

V. Insiders
Personal Perspectives on Autism

Able autistic individuals can rise to eminent positions and perform with such outstanding success that one may even conclude that only such people are capable of certain achievements ... Their unswerving determination and penetrating intellectual powers, part of their spontaneous and original mental activity, their narrowness and single-mindedness, as manifested in their special interests, can be immensely valuable and can lead to outstanding achievements in their chosen areas.

Hans Asperger (1944).

In this section, meet some of the regular posters to alt.support.autism and read about what they have to say about life on the autistic spectrum.

Contents:

  1. Quotes: The View from the Spectrum
  2. Activities: Work and interests of ACs We Know
    1. Paid and unpaid occupations
    2. Hobbies and intense interests
  3. Writing: Writing and personal websites from group members.
    1. Larry Arnold
    2. Anna Hayward
    3. Dave Spicer
    4. Others
  4. Websites: Sites by newsgroup participants

Theory of Mind in Autism:
Development, Implications, and Intervention

Contributed by:
Johanna Lantz, Graduate Assistant

Mind reading is often thought to be the activity of psychics, but in a sense most of us are mind readers, or at least we have a theory of mind. The concept of theory of mind can be difficult to grasp, as is typical with any exploration into the mental world of humans. This construct does not represent a single cognition, behavior, or emotion. The mind is comprised of beliefs, desires, emotions, perceptions, and intentions. Theory of mind is the ability to attribute these mental states to self and others in order to understand and predict behavior. It involves making the distinction between the real world and mental representations of the world. Individuals with autism spectrum disorder tend to be less proficient “mind readers” compared to people who are typical. Theory of mind deficits can be used to explain the social and communication impairments that define autism spectrum disorder. This article will compare the typical development of theory of mind with the development of mental state understanding in individuals with autism spectrum disorder. Implications of theory of mind challenges will be discussed and intervention approaches will be suggested.

Typical and Atypical Theory of Mind Development

Theory of mind development begins early in life, as does the shift from the typical course of development that is seen in children across the autism spectrum. Antecedents to theory of mind development are evident in infancy. At 5 months of age, typical children can recognize different facial expressions, but understanding the meaning occurs a few months later. Once young children are able to reliably interpret the facial expressions of others, they begin to use this nonverbal information to guide their behavior. For example, a toddler may look at his mother’s face for cues about whether it is safe to approach an unfamiliar person. Dawson and Osterling (1994) studied videotapes of first birthday parties of typical children and children who later received a diagnosis of Autistic Disorder and found that the best predictor of future diagnosis was lack of attention to the face of others. Considering this evidence, it is not surprising that young children with autism spectrum disorder usually do not se the gaze of another to guide their behavior.

Intention, or acting in a particular way either consciously or unconsciously to bring about a desired outcome, is also an early marker of theory of mind development. Within the first year of life infants come to understand that the behavior of others is goal-directed. Children with autism spectrum tend to use people as objects. For example, they may grab an adult’s hand and use it to reach a desired item. Intentional communication begins in infancy in the form of gestures and moves to simple language. Joint attention is a form of intentional communication and refers to behaviors such as pointing to or bringing an object of interest to another person to share enjoyment, or changing eye gaze to share attention with another. Children with autism are less likely to use joint attention, but may point to request an object. In addition, the use of gestures to communicate is often strikingly absent in people with autism spectrum disorders across ages. To summarize, children with autism spectrum disorders often fail to develop the prerequisites of theory of mind.

Typically developing two year olds engage in pretend play and demonstrate some understanding of pretense. Two year olds with autism usually do not engage in pretend or imaginative play; rather, their play tends to be limited to the exploration of the physical aspects of toys. Children with autism rarely imagine an object to be something that it is not (e.g., pretending a block is a car). At approximately two years of age, typical children can predict the desires of others. In other words, they can understand what other people may want, and that this may be different from their own desires. Children with autism have less difficulty understanding simple desires compared to other mental states such as beliefs, but they still lag behind their typical peers in this area of development (Baron-Cohen, 1993).

Most investigation of theory of mind development has focused on 3 to 4 year old children. It is evident that between the ages of 3 to 4 there is rapid development in this area. Three year olds typically fail to recognize their own and other’s false-beliefs (holding beliefs that conflict with reality). Wimmer and Perner (1983) developed a means of measuring false-belief understanding, and although many subsequent studies have modified the task, the classic false belief task is as follows:

A character named Maxi places a chocolate candy in a kitchen cabinet and leaves the room to play. While he is playing, his mother enters the room and moves his candy into a drawer, without Maxi witnessing this switch. Then, Maxi returns and the child participant is asked where Maxi will search for his candy, in the cabinet or the drawer. Often the child is asked where they believe the candy is located as well.

Correct responses to false-belief tasks increase with age: children at 30 months answer false-belief questions correctly only about 20% of the time, children at 44 months are correct about 50% of the time, and at 4 years of age children perform better than chance, answering most correctly (Wellman et al., 2001). Various studies have shown that the majority (around 80%) of children with autism, even those with average intelligence, fail measures of false-belief (Baron-Cohen, 1993). In other words, children with autism across the age span will often answer that Maxi will immediately search for the candy in the drawer. As typical children mature, they increasingly would understand Maxi’s perspective and would suggest that Maxi would search for candy in the cabinet.

Typical 3 year old children understand the simple emotions of others, but have difficulty understanding feelings such as surprise that are the result of mistaken beliefs. By the age of 5, children can recognize feelings that are the result of an unexpected outcome (Hadwin & Perner, 1991). For example, a 5 year old understands that Maxi is surprised because he thought the chocolate was in the cabinet, but it was not there when he looked. For individuals with autism, difficulties with emotional understanding persist throughout life.

Research on theory of mind has traditionally focused on preschool children because this is when there is an apparent rapid development of mental state understanding. Less is known about theory of mind in older children, although there is acknowledgement that further development occurs in this area as children mature. During the school years, children learn to understand that people’s actions do not always reflect their true inner feelings, and that people can have a variety of feelings at one time, some of which conflict. School-aged children understand irony, sarcasm, ”white lies”, the distinction between literal and non-literal speech, and metaphors indicating more advanced ability to understand the beliefs of others. Individuals with autism spectrum disorders often struggle with these aspects of communication, even when they have almost typical language. This is a particularly salient feature of Asperger’s syndrome.

Implications of
Theory of Mind Difficulties

Theory of mind difficulties can provide a possible explanation for the communication and social challenges that define autism spectrum disorders. Howlin, Baron-Cohen, and Hadwin (1999) further identified deception, empathy, self-consciousness, and the use of persuasion as being dependent on theory of mind understanding. Imagine trying to understand and interact with other people without knowing their thoughts, feelings, or beliefs. Consider the following scenario:

A woman is presenting the status of a project she has been working on at the end of a long staff meeting. Toward the middle of her presentation she notices a colleague looks at her watch and sighs. A man at the meeting starts to nod off while others become fidgety. Her boss asks her to “wrap it up” and even though she is not finished, she decides to end her presentation. As people begin to exit the room, her colleague who was on the verge of falling asleep while she was talking tells her that her project sounds very interesting.


Typical people often take for granted how much we use our understanding of other people’s thoughts and feelings to guide our social interactions. In the example above, the speaker was able to read the nonverbal cues of others indicating that they were bored and tired; consequently, she decided to end her presentation. The presenter did not take the phrase “wrap it up” literally, and she knew that the boss intended “it” to mean the presentation, even though this had to be implied from the context. Finally, the speaker probably realized that her sleepy colleague’s comment about her project is probably a “white lie”, and that his comment did not match his belief or behavior, but instead reflected his desire to please her. Now imagine being a person with an autism spectrum disorder faced with a situation similar to the scenario presented above. An individual within the autism spectrum most likely would have behaved differently as a result of not being privy to the mental states of others.


In individuals with autism spectrum disorders, theory of mind difficulties have a definite impact on their ability to interact in the social world. People with autism may not understand the many unwritten social rules that exist in the “neurotypical” culture, and that these rules often change with the context. For example, a man with an autism spectrum disorder may be told that it is okay to ask close friends or children how old they are, but it is considered impolite to ask strangers or older people their age. Now imagine he accepted a job at a license branch and is told to verify the age of the customer. He would likely become upset because in his mind this is breaking the rules. Another implication of the inability to “mind-read” is that people with autism spectrum disorder may talk endlessly about a topic and may not be able to detect the listener’s nonverbal signals that they are not interested. Individuals across the spectrum may be brutally honest and in return, take all words as truth. This also leads to problems understanding deceit, which can put their safety at-risk. People with autism may not understand that an event they experienced was not experienced by all, so they may not be able to provide the background necessary to be understood by others. For example, a man with an autism spectrum disorder gets on the wrong bus and is consequently late for work.

He might not understand that he needs to explain to his employer why he is late, because he assumes his boss knows the reason. From these few examples, it becomes easy to see how confusing life can be when you have trouble understanding the thoughts and feelings of others.

Developing “Mind-Reading” Skills

To address the theory of mind challenges faced by individuals across the autism spectrum, Howlin, Baron-Cohen and Hadwin (1999) developed an intervention guide entitled, Teaching Children with Autism to Mind-Read: A Practical Guide. The Guide provides information on how to teach theory of mind skills to individuals across the autism spectrum while taking into consideration the developmental stages of theory of mind acquisition. The program was developed for children ages 4-13 whose language ability is at about the 5 year old level, but the authors encourage teachers to make adaptations to suit individuals of any age or ability level. The Guide is divided into three instructional areas as follows:

  1. Emotion. Activities designed to help children understand the emotions of others include instruction in recognizing facial expressions from photos and schematic drawings, and identifying situation-, desire-, and belief-based emotions.

  2. Informational States. The second part of the Guide offers instruction in simple and complex visual perspective taking; understanding that “seeing leads to knowing”; predicting actions on the basis of a person’s knowledge; and understanding false-beliefs.

  3. Pretend Play. The last section of the Guide suggests activities to promote the development of play skills from the child’s current level of functioning (e.g., sensorimotor play) to pretend play.

The Guide includes information on how to assess and establish a baseline of the child’s current level of functioning and provides record forms to track progress after each session. Teaching procedures and suggested materials are also identified. The authors encourage the use of reinforcement of correct responses and “error-free” teaching, where the child is prompted to make correct responses. In addition, they suggest always starting a session with mastered skills before proceeding to more difficult tasks. The Guide provides a practical approach to instruction in theory of mind that can be used in both clinical and educational settings.

Carol Gray’s book, Comic Strip Conversations, is another resource available to help individuals with autism spectrum disorders develop theory of mind understanding. This activity involves using simple drawings to illustrate conversations between people.

With the help of a parent or professional, participants use drawings to comprehend problem situations and to communicate ideas in conversational form. They are asked to identify what people do, say, and most importantly, think in social situations. Color is added to the comic strips to represent emotion.

This activity is versatile, is easy to implement in any setting, and capitalizes on the visual processing strengths of individuals with autism spectrum disorders. Catherine Faherty developed a workbook for children or adolescents with autism spectrum disorders entitled, What Does It Mean To Me?. The purpose of this workbook is to help children with autism learn about autism and to develop self-awareness. There are two parts of each chapter. The first section contains worksheets for the child and parent or professional to complete together. The second section provides additional suggestions for the home and school environment. Although the entire workbook is not specifically designed to increase theory of mind understanding, several worksheets within the text are appropriate for this purpose.

An additional resource that contains suggestions and activities that target theory of mind challenges is Jeanette McAfee’s book entitled, Navigating the Social World. McAfee’s text is designed for use by parents, professionals, and paraprofessionals who live or work with individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome or high-functioning autism. The book contains programs meant to help individuals gain social and emotional skills, including activities that target theory of mind understanding. Tasks are designed to complement the learning style of people with autism spectrum disorder. For example, activities are broken down into steps and are repeated until mastered. The use of reinforcement is encouraged to maintain motivation. McAfee’s book offers numerous strategies that are practical and easy to implement.


The resources cited above can be borrowed by Indiana residents from the Center for Disability and Information and Referral (CEDIR) at the Indiana Institute on Disability and Community, 2853 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, IN 47408-2696, (800) 437-7924 (toll free in Indiana: voice/TT); (812) 855-9396 (Bloomington; voice/TT).

Summary

Theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to self and others in order to understand and predict behavior, is an area of weakness for individuals across the autism spectrum. The development of theory of mind begins in infancy, as does the shift from the typical course that is seen in children with autism spectrum disorders. While the peak in theory of mind development occurs in typical children from the age of 3 to 4, mental state understanding in individuals within the spectrum often continues to be conspicuously absent throughout the lifespan and leads to significant social and communicative challenges. Many practical resources are available to help parents, teachers, professionals, and paraprofessionals teach and support people with autism spectrum disorder become better “mind-readers.”

References

Baron-Cohen, S. (1993). From attention-goal psychology to belief-desire psychology: the development of a theory of mind, and its dysfunction.

In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and D.J.Cohen (Eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism (pp.59-82). New York: Oxford University Press.

Dawson & Osterling (1994). Early recognition of children with autism: A study of first birthday home videotapes. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24, 247-257.

Faherty, C. (2000). What does it mean to me? A workbook for explaining self-awareness and life lessons to the child or youth with high-functioning autism or Aspergers. Arlington, TX: Future Horizons.

Gray, C. (1994). Comic strip conversations: Colorful illustrated interactions with students with autism and related disorders. Jenison, MI: Jenison Public Schools.

Hadwin, J., & Perner, J. (1991). Pleased and surprised: Children’s cognitive theory of emotion. In G.E. Butterworth, P.L. Harris, A.M. Leslie, & H.M. Wellman (Eds.), Perspectives on the child’s theory of mind (pp.215-235). New York: Oxford University Press.

Howlin, P., Baron-Cohen, S., & Hadwin, J. (1999). Teaching children with autism to mind-read: A practical guide. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.

McAfee, J. (2001). Navigating the social world: A curriculum for educating individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome and high-functioning autism. Arlington, TX: Future Horizons, Inc.

Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of perception. Cognition, 13, 103-128.

Wellman, H.M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of -mind development: The truth about false-belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684


Lantz, J. (2002). Theory of mind in autism: Development, implications, and interventions. The Reporter, 7(3), 18-25.

Autism Aspergers Myths - The Theory of Mind

[More Theories & Myths]

The Theory of Mind is firmly established among autism professionals. Just as with The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night Time, I am concerned about the conclusions drawn from it.

"Theory of mind refers to the notion that many autistic individuals do not understand that other people have their own plans, thoughts, and points of view. Furthermore, it appears that they have difficulty understanding other people's beliefs, attitudes, and emotions.

Interestingly, people with autism have difficulty comprehending when others don't know something. It is quite common, especially for those with savant abilities, to become upset when asking a question of a person to which the person does not know the answer.

By not understanding that other people think differently than themselves, many autistic individuals may have problems relating socially and communicating to other people. That is, they may not be able to anticipate what others will say or do in various situations. In addition, they may have difficulty understanding that their peers or classmates even have thoughts and emotions, and may thus appear to be self-centered, eccentric, or uncaring.

The vital question which must be asked is: How does one teach individuals with autism to understand and acknowledge the thoughts and feelings of others?" (Citation from http://www.autism.org/mind.html)

If I can rewrite the above passage, it would be:

Autistic people see others as clones of themselves because they do not have a coherent, independent self that "separates" them from other people. Hence, they instinctively expect others to perceive, think, feel, sense and behave like them.

Even if their conscious mind understands the concept of different selves and could explain this concept, they will subconscious take for granted that other people are like them. Faced with a situation where others disagree with them, they cannot help but feel anger and frustration of the "irrationality" of other people. "Can't they see such an obvious truth?!" is a common retort.

The autistic self is fragmented - its body, emotions, will and intellect do not work together. Without a coherent sense of self, only the intellect can fully mature. The resulting autistic consciousness differs greatly from non-autistic consciousness, making it easy to develop misunderstandings.

Without a coherent self as the foundation, the concept of Personal History may not arise. Unable to learn from past experiences and use it to extrapolate the behavior, intentions and reactions of other people, the autistic finds it difficult to understand others. As the natural social and bodily instincts could not activate, the happenings of everyday life become stressful challenges that must be handled consciously by the intellect.

A coherent self provides the foundation for social instincts to function, and social instincts make it possible to have spontaneous, appropriate and enjoyable social behavior. The vital question is: How does one help autistics develop a coherent self so that their instincts can arise spontaneously?

I call this, "The Theory of Self".




Autism Theory of Mind Revisited

[More Theories & Myths]

2 pairs of legs

A follow-up to Autism Myths - Theory of Mind

Although there are many research works on autism, few address the subjective experience of autism. I propose that autistics have a different form of consciousness from non-autistics, which arose from their different experience of self.


About the self

Our self is not a fixed object, but a changing hologram-like system of sensations (of the body), emotions (and desires), thoughts (of facts and information), perception (the way we organized and judge information) and consciousness - the 5 "combinations" of the mind. The connections between these systems link the self together. Without these connections, the self does not function.

With few connections, the self becomes dispersed and does not "awake" or become active. Thus, the person "sleepwalks". With unbalanced connections (too many in some areas and too little in others), the self becomes very awake in some parts and asleep in others. This distorts the inner experience of the person who then lives a distorted life.


Comparisons

My own experiences revealed the most striking aspects of the autistic consciousness:

AUTISTIC

NON-AUTISTIC

Fact based consciousness - Thoughts and experiences organized chronologically or by logical categories People based consciousness - Thoughts and emotions are organized by human archetypes or experiences with people
Knowledge as the goal, analysisas the tool - The autistic has simple desires, such as to fulfill curiosity and avoid trouble Fulfilling desires as the goal, exercising influence as the tool - All thought, words and deeds are aimed to create the right influence among other people to achieve desires
Emotions are at the edges of consciousness, tying together any unexplainable areas Emotions at the core of consciousness, indistinguishable from other conscious experience

Audio-visual imagination separated from tactile senses (like watching TV)

Tactile senses complement audio-visual imagination without any separation in one's imagination
Self has an open boundary - tends assume that other people are like them and trusts them equally Self has a closed boundary - tends to bond with those they feel "comfortable" with; regulates people with different levels of trust & information access
Consciousness does not "mark" non-verbal behavior as important, thus dismissing them as irrelevant Consciousness reacts instantly to subtle changes in non-verbal cues: Reactive Predictive Communications
Consciousness experienced mostly through the self as the experiences and thoughts of an individual Consciousness experienced mostly through one's social circle as the collective impression one has created
Locus of control weak or missing - the autistic does not experience a strong sense of control over his thoughts, emotions and deeds Locus of control inherent - the non-autistic experiences his thoughts, emotions and deeds as willed by himself

Theory of Mind

Theory of Mind refers to the notion that many autistic individuals do not understand that other people have their own plans, thoughts, and points of view. Furthermore, it appears that they have difficulty understanding other people's beliefs, attitudes, and emotions.

This passage might offend autistics because it sounds like this:

I have no idea why autistic people think the way they do. Maybe it is because they are not socially intelligent enough to understand that other people do not think the same as them. Perhaps we can only make them understand by dumbing down social skills and then patiently teach them.

I propose the "Theory of Self" as a substitute. The key is that:

  1. Autistics could not understand non-autistics because they do not have the experience of non-autistics
  2. If they have such experiences, it will help them understand and adapt to mainstream society
  3. To experience this, they must recreate the sense of self as experienced by non-autistics

People who are color blind could not imagine certain colors, but if we can let them catch a glimpse of colors, they will understand. If they spontaneously recover their sense of colors, their visual instincts will take over and help orientate them fast. Likewise, I believe that if only we can let the autistic catch a glimpse of how non-autistics experience life, it will aid them much in their development.


Psychological Barriers

The first step I took was to realize that I existed. For me to exist, I must choose. For me to choose, I must defy what others ordered me to do in order to build a future that I envisioned myself. It is not easy to develop their will, especially if they have authoritarian parents who micromanage their every decision.

The second step also requires much courage, because the autistic often develops hidden barriers as they grow up. I call these "psychological barriers", which may consist of:

  1. Fear of people, novel situations, being judged as inferior, social rejection
  2. Anger from being bullied, mistreated, misunderstood, ignored, rejected
  3. Loneliness from social handicaps, difficulty finding play partners & team mates
  4. Pride from rejecting non-autistic ways, associating with "elite" people, being a genius or expert

These habitual responses arise emotional patterns embedded in the subconscious. Although non-autistics can also experience them, autistics are especially vulnerable due to their difficulty adapting to life on Planet Earth. I experienced 5 factors that helped me resolve these barriers:

  1. Conversations with God books - convinced me that the world is good, beautiful & meaningful
  2. Emotional Releasing - provided a tool to release old patterns consciously
  3. Work experience with accommodating colleagues - allowed me to try new experiences in real life
  4. Writing stories - the stories came alive as I wrote, giving me a glimpse into the life of non-autistics
  5. Experiencing my life work - seeing the results of my life work told me why I must make the effort

The Result

The journey to adapt to Planet Earth took many years, starting from the end of 2002 to 2007.

  1. I started feeling that the world is alive, even the rocks and buildings
  2. Emotions became strong and difficult to control, much like wild horses
  3. 3D perception returned spontaneously together with my bodily awareness
  4. I started to relax as my perception of time normalized and I stopped feeling anxious or bored
  5. People made sense as I "felt them within me", and I just knew what to say or do
  6. I began to understand many concepts "in a flash" without using words or logic
  7. Emotions moderated themselves into a sense of confidence after I gained enough real-life experience to understand how the world works

I believe that I was catching up on my emotional development from the pre-teenage level to post-teenage during this period of time. It seemed that my systems were only waiting for me to begin exploring my emotions before it triggered everything else.

I believe that this inside-out approach will work for other high functioning autistics with self-consciousness. However, they must first choose to accept non-autistics and change their ways. As I am not an autism professional, I can only share my observations in the hope that it will help other people.

The Theory of Mind implies that we should focus on external understanding of relationships rather than the inner development of self hood. I believe that this only treats the symptoms rather than the root cause.

Autistic children can learn social skills like a computer running a program. Following orders without understanding, relating feels like a burden rather than as a pleasure. Without instincts to guide them, they rely on habit and (limited) experience. As they could not master novel situations, they prefer to avoid them. Without the ability to enjoy what life brings them, they remain unhappy and frustrated with life.

I would like to contribute to a more complete understanding of autism. Perhaps someday, someone will find an effective way of helping autistics develop their instincts that people in Third World countries can afford. For now, I can only demonstrate this possibility by my own example.



The Curious Incident of the Dog
in the Night-Time by Mark Haddon

Cat Statue

[More Theories & Myths]

The Curious Incident of the Dog is the story of how a 15 year old autistic boy solves the mystery of who murdered his neighbor's dog. [Of course there is more to it, but I am not giving spoilers away.]

In 2003, a lady who works at a special needs school in Singapore showed it to me and asked for my comment. I read two pages. The protagonist (Christopher Boone) was describing his stream of consciousness. As I read, I felt my mind spinning. I gave up trying to untangle my confusion, returned the book and thanked the lady. When she asked for my comments again, I mentioned politely that the book was not really about autism.

Years later, I figured out why. The book was written by someone pretending to be autistic. No wonder I was puzzled! It was usually autistics pretending to be "normal", not the other way around!

WARNING: THIS BOOK WILL NOT HELP YOU UNDERSTAND REAL AUTISTICS

Mark Haddon did not use the word "autism" in his book, let alone claim to portray autism accurately. Certainly, he was not at fault. I have nothing against Mark Haddon or his work. In fact, I finally understood enough about non-autistic people to enjoy it in 2006.

However, seeing that the Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time has became very popular, I feel that I must explain why it should not to be taken seriously when many people (including teachers and autism professionals) recommend it as reading material on autism. Instead of a fictitious novel, I recommend reading real autism reference books by authors like Dr. Temple Grandin and Donna Williams. They have many accurate and useful first-hand insights on autism.

While reading the Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time, I noted that Christopher is highly self-aware, and could articulate his thoughts so clearly. This was very different from my own experience. At his age, I was still mostly in a state of sleepwalking. I was unaware of my own emotions, body and situational awareness.

I was a very high functioning autistic who went through normal schooling without any help, medication or trouble with the school authorities. The lower-functioning autistics probably have even less self-awareness than me. However, Mark Haddon could not have had a story if Christopher could not able to convey to us what is happening within him. Thus, his depictions of Christopher's inner state are used to advance his story and interest viewers. They are not meant to represent autistic consciousness.


On page 84 of the book, there is a passage that goes like this:

And he said, "What's 251 times 864?"

And I thought about this and I said: "216,864". Because it was a really easy sum because you just multiply 864 X 1000 which is 864,000. Then you divide it by 4 which is 216,000 and that's 250 x 864. Then you add another 864 on to it and get 251 x 864. And that's 216,864.

The paragraph shows Christopher working logically through the sums. Although autistics often reason with logic, their logic is often of a different quality. There are many autistics who accept queer ideas and persist with them despite convincing argument. Yes, they are logical, but their logic is not necessarily of high quality. I concede that it is possible an autistic would reason as above with sufficient training, but I consider this an exception, not the rule.

Autistic savants do not use logic, because it is too slow. They tap into the parallel processing power of the brain, often using the kinesthetic and visual processors of their brain. If I could rewrite this paragraph, perhaps it might read like this:

And he said, "What's 251 times 864?"

As Christopher heard this, in his mind appeared two green shapes that looked a lot like uneven cubes. The shapes clashed into each other and rippled with lots of tiny cubes, squares and triangles. Eventually a new shape was formed. Christopher replied: "216,864".

He was shocked. "Wow, that's even faster than a calculator. How did you do it?"

Christopher was puzzled and thought carefully about what he meant. Perhaps he was asking who solved the sum. "I did."

"I mean, what trick did you use?"

It took me a while for Christopher to understand what he said. Maybe he means, tricks as in cheating. So he means if Christopher had cheated. "No."

"I don't get it," he declared. And to this very day, he still could not figure out Christopher's secrets.

As a side-note, autistic youths usually have to struggle to understand human speech, especially the context behind every word. The smooth flow of thoughts and the apparent ease of understanding human speech in the novel are highly unrealistic experiences.








On page 163, there is a passage that goes like this:

And one day, Julie sat down at a desk next to me and put a tube of Smarties on the desk, and she said, "Christopher, what do you think is in here?"

And I said, "Smarties".

Then she took the top off the Smarties tube and turned it upside down and a little pencil came out and she laughed and I said, "It's not Smarties, it's a pencil" .

Then she put the little red pencil back inside the Smarties tube and put the top back on.

Then she said, "If your Mommy came in now, and we asked her what was inside the Smarties tube, what do you think she would say?", because I used to call Mother Mummy then, not Mother.

And I said, "A pencil".

That was because when I was little I didn't understand about other people having minds. And Julie said to Mother and Father that I would always find this very difficult. But I don't find this difficult now. Because I decided that it was a kind of puzzle, and if something is a puzzle there is always a way of solving it."

This passage shows an amazing level of self-consciousness, expressed as if Christopher could dissect his own brain. I believe is the last thing an autistic youth would naturally say. I also believe that it is not minds per se that autistics could not understand, but the concept of their own self.

When I became aware of autism, I was more interested to discuss how irrational and strange non-autistics were. The novel does not address the great confusion, frustration, anxiety and loneliness autistics undergo. Many autistics have to constantly validate themselves about how good they are in order fight against their own low self-esteem. The last thing I wanted to do at that time was to acknowledge that other people were superior to me.

In addition, I feel that the passage also shows a gross misunderstanding of the autistic perception and reasoning patterns. Perhaps the passage might be rewritten in this manner.

I was put in a cold room smelling of strangeness-A (translated: antiseptic). The lady with big black glasses asked me many questions. I just answered as much as I can.

For example, she showed me a Smarties (tube) and asked me what it is. I said, "Smarties". Then she took out a pencil from the Smarties (tube) and made some odd sounds and movement (translated: slight laughing and smiling).

I remained still, not knowing what to do or say, except that the light glaring off her glasses is disturbing me, so I flicked my eyes around her spectacle frame. She asked me what I saw. Glancing at her hand, I replied "a pencil". Then she put the pencil back into the Smarties tube.

She asked me, "If your Mommy came in now, and we asked her what was inside the Smarties tube, what do you think she would say?"

I took a while to understand what she said. It was a long sentence and I must grind through it carefully. She repeated the question again, and again. After a while, I concluded that it meant: "What is inside the tube?" So I answered her: "A pencil."

And no one ever knew what was really happening.


On page 208, there is a passage that goes like this:

So I carried on walking. And I could feel the feeling like a balloon inside my chest and it hurt and I covered my ears with my hands and I went and stood against the wall of a little shop which said "Hotel Reservations Tel: 0207 402 5164" in the middle of the big room and then I took my hands away from my ears and I groaned to block out the noise and i looked round the big room at all the signs to see if this was London. And the signs said:

"Sweet Pasteries Heathrow Airport Check-In Here Begel Factory ..."

After a few seconds they looked like this:

"Sweathr..."

because there were too many and my brain wasn't working properly and this frightened me so I closed my eyes again and slowly counted to 50 but without doing the cubes.

When I read this passage, I shook my head and muttered: "That's not it". The entire passage just sounds wrong to my intuition. As far as I know, perception remains constant (so if they are distorted already they will be distorted from the start). The idea that Christopher would think that his mind is not working right is kind of far-fetched too.

Perhaps the passage might be rewritten in this manner.

So my legs just wandered around where my eyes pointed me. The world became dizzy and confusing. There are too many lines (translated: words from people) striking me. I tried to cover my eyes and scream so that these lines would go away, but they won't.

I screamed more.

The world became flashes and dots of light and lines. That mades me sink into darkness and sleep.


Although there are more discrepancies in the book, I believe that these 3 examples are enough food for thought. I wrote this not to belittle The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time, but to remind readers that this book is not going to help them to understand real autistics.

Usually, I do not like to critique other people's work. I prefer to publish works to convey the experience of autism more clearly.


Autism Social Accounting Model

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I developed the Social Accounting Model to simplify my policies of social interaction. I began using it when I was drafted into the military in 2002 in order to protect myself from a potentially hostile and alien social environment. Just before my departure, my mother had instructed me to bring some snacks to give to my bunkmates and bring a Swiss knife to loan them. This effort paid off when my entire platoon woke up in the middle of the night to save me from a potential beating by a few other platoons.

After my posting to a civilian unit, I applied the same strategy to my colleagues. Unlike my experience in schools and the Polytechnic where I never used any social strategies, my colleagues eagerly accepted me into their midst. This strategy has compensated for my social deficits and turned potentially negative working relationships into positive ones. Over the next few years working in the Army as well as living overseas, I deepened my understanding of relationships and refined this strategy further. The key idea is that we can improve our relationships to people if we provide benefits to them. Likewise, we will cause our relationships with other people to deteriorate if we cause trouble for them.


Passing through the tunnel

Let us imagine that each of us has a bank account with everyone else. Let us further imagine that whenever we help someone or do them a favor, we deposit "social tokens" into his or her account with us. Likewise, when we demand help or favors from another person, we withdraw "social tokens" from this account. The balance of tokens determines the state of your relationship - a surplus of token means that the person likes you and you can call on him or her to help you. A deficit means that the person dislikes you and you must add more tokens to the account in order to repair the relationship.

Tokens can take many forms. For instance, the loan of equipment, advice in solving a problem and of course, saving lives. However, tokens have unequal value. A compliment may count as a token, but it is worth very little as words are cheap. [I mean, anyone can praise you at very low cost to themselves.] However, using saving your buddy from imminent danger counts as a very expensive token, as you are saving your buddy's life which he or she values greatly.

The value of the token is based solely on the subjective judgment of the recipient. This means that what you may think is a deposit to the recipient may in fact be a withdrawal, and will be recorded as such. Thus, when you help another person, you should be as sure as possible that you are in fact, providing positive tokens. Although each person values tokens differently, there are some rules on how this is done:

Intrinsic Value Premium: A token is more valuable if it can help another person receive or protect something he or she values highly, compared to something he or she does not value. In other words, if a person values his antique collection highly and you save them from a robbery attempt, you will get a much higher token than say, if you save him from being robbed of his wallet.

Hyperbolic Discounting: A token is more valuable when it is needed now then when it is further away in the future. A token realizes the highest value at the point of greatest distress, such as just after an accident has happened.

Obligation Discounting: A token is more valuable if it comes from someone who has no obligation to give. For instance, we may expect a friend who owes us many favors or a family member to help us. If they help, they get much lesser token than a stranger. However, if they do not help, they get penalized much more heavily than a stranger. Likewise, we will be upset if the firemen did not save us from a fire since it is their responsibility to do so. However, we will not blame the passersby outside the burning house for not daring to risk their lives to come to the rescue.

Monopoly Premium: A token is more valuable if fewer people can provide it. For instance, if you are the only person who knows how to solve computer problems in the office, your help will be valued higher than if everyone else also knows how to solve computer problems.

Opportunity Cost Premium: A token is more valuable if it costs the other person a lot to provide it. For instance, if you use your unprotected body to block gunfire for your buddy (verses say, using a thick steel shield), your buddy will value your help a lot more because you are putting your life at great risk.

Surprise Premium: Help is valued more when you do not expect it to come, and likewise, unexpected trouble is detested more. If you help a troubled stranger at the airport without him requesting your help, your help will be valued more highly than if he asks you first. If someone waits for you at the airport for a few minutes at your request and unexpectedly misses an important flight as a result, you can expect to be heavily penalized.

Intent Factor: Whether a token is positive or negative depends greatly on how the person perceives your intent. Most Neurotypical dramas occur because someone misjudges the intent of another person and reverses the token's value from positive to negative or vice-versa. If you know that someone is strongly prejudiced against your race or country, then your sincere offer to help that person may be misconstrued as an attempt at manipulation or some other negative intent. The resulting token will be negative instead of positive. Likewise, if you create a huge blunder but your intent is judged as positive, you may not be penalized at all.

Feedback Effect: Reinforcing feedback loops play a major factor with the system. If you start on a positive footing, the other person will tend to see your intent as positive on your next token contribution. He or she is also likely to reciprocate positive tokens to you. Thus, as time passes, the positive token exchange strengthens. Likewise, if you start on a negative footing, the situation will tend to worsen as time passes. Thus, it is very important to actively take the first step to create positive social token exchanges in a new social situation.

Awareness Factor: Lastly, if the recipient is unaware of or forgets about your help, he or she will not token anything into your account. He must be aware that you are helping him in order to record the token. This is why, if you are doing overtime as a favor to your boss, that you remind him subtly such as by sending him an email before you leave.









There are a few important ideas behind this system for autistic people:

1) You can use social tokens to "buy" your way to non-conformity. In other words, if you have enough tokens, you can selectively trade it for the option not to attend social events or fulfill social obligations. This is very important for relief from social pressure while maintaining friendly relationships with everyone.

2) The Social Accounting System can be a win-win system. Unlike normal arithmetic, giving someone a token does not mean that you lose a token of equal value. Tokens are worth what the recipient perceives, not any absolute value.

3) You can create the maximum positive values for the largest number of social tokens at minimum cost to yourself, provided you understand how the system works and you have something positive to contribute. You can accomplish this using strategies such as "skills monopoly" (e.g. being the only person with certain valuable skills) and "token arbitrage" (e.g. the borrowing of a newspaper from one person to lend to 5 people).

4) You can use the Social Accounting System to create a unique niche for yourself in the social eco-system: that of the friendly, neutral third party. If you master this system, you may find yourself the only person who can bridge all the different cliques in a hostile office. With this, you add social value to your office and help bring Humanity a little closer to World Peace.

Taking the best from both the Neurotypical and autistic cultures, the correct application of the Social Accounting System can bring our social interactions to a much higher level. It can also help autistics appreciate why other people dislike them and how to change that situation. Before ending this article, I would like to highlight a few more points:

We must build human relationships with a sustainable, long-term view in mind. This means that whatever social role we play and contributions we give must not tire us. The personality that we show to other people must also be our real personality.

We must also ensure that we know the actual social situation. Many people quarrel because their accounting do not match with each other. A husband may think that buying dinner home is a social token deposit, while the wife may perceive it as a social token withdrawal because it implies that she has inferior culinary skills or is too lazy to cook. Over the long term, the withdrawals can add up and cause problems for the relationship.

Although this transactional view of relationships may not truly represent how relationships work, I believe that it is an effective way to translate concepts such as social responsibility, social contribution and the Golden Rule (i.e. do unto others what you want others to do unto you) for socially handicapped people. I believe that the proper use of strategies based on this model will help autistics get along with other people in a way that typical social skills and (anti-bullying) assertiveness training could never achieve.

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Neuroimaging of genesis and satiation of thirst and an interoceptor-driven theory of origins of primary consciousness

  1. Derek Denton*,,,
  2. Robert Shade,
  3. Frank Zamarippa§,
  4. Gary Egan*,
  5. John Blair-West,
  6. Michael McKinley*,
  7. Jack Lancaster§, and
  8. Peter Fox§

+Author Affiliations

  1. §Research Imaging Center, University of Texas Health Science Center, Floyd Curl Drive, San Antonio, TX; *Howard Florey Institute of Experimental Physiology and Medicine, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia; and Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research, P.O. Box 760549, San Antonio, Texas 78245-0549
  1. Contributed by Derek Denton

Abstract

There are defined hypothalamic functions in the genesis of thirst, but little is known of the cortical processes subserving consciousness of thirst notwithstanding the medical disorders that occur in psychiatric illness, addiction, and the attested decline of thirst with aging. In 10 adult males, positron emission tomography scans were made (i) during genesis of moderate thirst by infusion of i.v. hypertonic saline 0.51 M, (ii) after irrigation of the mouth with water to remove the sensation of dryness, and (iii) 3, 14, 45, and 60 minutes after drinking water to fully satiate thirst. The correlation of regional cerebral blood flow with thirst score showed the major activation to be in the posterior cingulate. Maximum thirst sensation evoked 13 highly significant activations and 9 deactivations in cingulate and parahippocampal gyri, insula, thalamus, amygdala, and mesencephalon. It is possible that cingulate sites (Brodmann’s areas 32, 24, and 31) that persisted with wet mouth but disappeared immediately after drinking to satiation may have an important role in the consciousness of thirst. Consciousness of thirst, a primal vegetative emotion, and satiation of thirst appear to be subserved by phylogenetically ancient brain regions. This is salient to current discussion on evolutionary emergence of primary consciousness.

In the face of dehydration (increase of extracellular sodium concentration) and osmotic pressure, animals actively seek water, often by using memory of the sources. This is consonant with J. Z. Young’s (1) emphasis that a general definition of intentionality is a property of mental life that refers to entities that are not observable, that is, not immediately present at the time. Longuet Higgins (2) has suggested that for an animal to have an intention, to have a goal, may require it to form an internal model—an image of the external world. Thus, thirst behavior with search for water can be interpreted as evidence of consciousness. Water deprivation with progression of thirst to the point of desire totally occupying the stream of consciousness is an exemplar of a basic vegetative system. Rullier (3) in 1821 in the Dictionaire des Sciences Medicales par une Societé de Médicins et Chirurgiens said of thirst “le sentiment le plus vif et le plus impérieux de la vie.”

The phylogeny of drinking behavior has been comprehensively analyzed by Fitzsimons (4, 5). Overall, comparative studies of drinking as physiologically apt behavior suggest thirst sensation and intentional seeking of water might have emerged very early in vertebrates, with implications in the phylogeny of consciousness. Other evidence has suggested to biologists that primal awareness emerged in animals lower in the phylogenetic scale than mammals (610).

The primacy of structures in the anterior wall of the third ventricle (11), the role of osmoreceptors in the circumventricular organs (12, 13), and sodium sensors within the blood–brain barrier (14) in the genesis of thirst has been reviewed in the initial report of this work (15), which concerned the correlation of changes in regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) with change of plasma Na concentration.

Emergent knowledge of the primary hypothalamic genesis of thirst displaced the Cannon theory (16) that dry mouth was the primary cause. Sensory inflow from the dry mouth areas does, however, contribute to thirst sensation.

Disorders of thirst are important in clinical medicine. Polydipsia, which may lead to serious hyponatremia, is seen in psychiatric disorders (17, 18), as for example in schizophrenic inpatients (19, 20). Analysis of “rush” experienced by heroin and cocaine addicts showed that thirst was one of the highest of 20 ranked sensations (21) along with excitement, pleasure, and strength. Narcotics like morphine and pethidine have a large dipsogenic effect 2–6 hours after injection into rats (22). Conversely, the established decline in thirst sensation and attendant drinking behavior with aging (2325) is conducive to hypernatremia. This is often much amplified in confused states, cerebrovascular disease, and Alzheimer’s disease (26).

A major issue in the field of genetically programmed ingestive behavior is the fact that an animal or human, when dehydrated, will drink rapidly to satiation over 3–10 minutes. Thereupon, thirst and the motivation to drink disappears (27), long before the fluid drunk could be absorbed from the gut and correct any chemical changes—systemic or in brain fluids—that might be generative of thirst. This was confirmed experimentally (15). Striking alterations in consciousness of thirst occurred independent of any change of plasma Na concentration ([Na]) or osmolality. This process of rapid satiation, albeit with variation between species in relation to whether immediate correction of the total deficit occurs, carries high survival value because it allows animals to gratify desire and exit from situations, e.g., waterholes, where they are particularly vulnerable to predators (27). Thus, the study with the behavioral sequence contrived and the changes in consciousness of thirst so entrained addressed issues of broad biological importance.

In the positron emission tomography (PET) experiments described here, thirst was contrived in 10 male volunteers by an attested method of rapid intravenous infusion of hypertonic 0.51 M NaCl, which increased plasma [Na] by 4 mmol/liter. After control scans, scans were made during increasing plasma [Na] and when thirst reached an apogee (mean of 43 min after the end of the i.v. infusion). Thereupon, the subjects rinsed their mouth with water without swallowing, which removed the “dry mouth” component, although the thirst sensation remained. After scanning this condition, in which the mouth was wet but thirst persisted, they were permitted to drink water to fully satiate thirst, and were scanned sequentially at 3, 14, 45, and 60 minutes after the act of satiation.

METHODS

Subject Preparation.

The subjects were male, aged 24–36 years, and preparation, image analysis, and institutional consent procedures for this experiment have been reported in an earlier report (15). The experimental sequence involved two control rest scans, scanned during and at the end of rapid infusion of 0.51 M NaCl, when maximum thirst developed a mean of 43 min later, after irrigation of the mouth with water, and at 3, 14, 45, and 60 min after drinking water to satiation. The principal contrasts reported are of maximum thirst, wetting the mouth, and 3 and 14 min after drinking to satiation where each condition is compared to the first preinfusion nonthirsty baseline condition. PET and MRI scans were acquired with each subject supine and with his head supported in a foam-padded, hemicylindrical head holder, with eyes closed and in a quiet room. Each of these four primary comparisons achieved significance (P <>Z statistic analyses. Two statistical thresholds were used: one for large clusters, another for smaller clusters. Large clusters (≥60 contiguous voxels) were required to have a less rigorous Z threshold (Z > 1.96; uncorrected P <>Z threshold (Z > 3.27; uncorrected P <>

A correlational analysis also was undertaken (15), whereby rCBF was correlated against the thirst scores reported by each subject for each scan. Significant activations were chosen as those with Z scores >3.27.

A second independent analysis of the data also was undertaken. An automated image registration algorithm (AIR 3.0) (28, 29) was used to align the 10 PET images of each subject, using a linear transformation, to a standard average rCBF PET image located in Talairach space. Each PET image was then resampled at a 2.0 × 2.0 × 4.0 mm voxel size. Each subject’s MRI was aligned to a standard MRI located in Talairach space, and an average of the 10 individual MRIs was computed. The PET images were smoothed by using a three-dimensional 12-mm Full-Width Half-Maximum Gaussian blurring function (AIR 3.0). Statistical parametric mapping (SPM96) (30) was used to identify voxels that had statistically significant relative rCBF changes. Subtraction analyses comparing maximum thirst, wet mouth, and 3 and 14 minutes after drinking water to satiation to the first preinfusion scan were made. Also, a subtraction analysis was made between the three conditions involving a high state of thirst (100% infusion, maximum thirst, and wet mouth) and the six conditions where little or no thirst was experienced by the subjects—namely, the initial two resting scans and the scans taken 3, 14, 45, and 60 min after drinking to satiation. Significant activations were chosen as those having Z scores >2.33 and >20 voxels.

RESULTS

As reported (15), plasma [Na] increased by 4 mmol/liter at the end of the 0.51 M NaCl infusion (0.2 ml⋅kg−1⋅min−1 for 25 or 50 min), and the increased concentration persisted over the remainder of the experiment. The subjects evaluated thirst score on the basis of 10 being equivalent to the worst thirst the subject had experienced, and 0 being no sensation of thirst. The thirst score increased during the i.v. infusion, reached apogee of 5.25 ± 0.90 (mean ± SEM) with a mean of 43 ± 2.5 min after the infusion finished. Thirst score decreased (3.55 ± 0.64) but still remained highly significantly elevated after irrigating the mouth with water, and then fell to near baseline (0.85 ± 0.43) within 3 min of drinking water to satiation. It remained near baseline for the remainder of the experiment (15).

Correlation of Thirst Score and rCBF.

The principal brain area that correlated with thirst score is shown in Fig. 1 (0, −44, 8; cluster size 113, Z = 3.76). This posterior cingulate activation area involving Brodmann’s area (BA) 29 and BA 26 was bilateral, extending from x = +6 and −6. A number of subsignificant activations were observed in the left mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus (Z = 3.07) and the left pulvinar (x = −18, y = −24, z = −2; cluster size 42; Z = 3.16), and in the anterior cingulate in BA 24 and BA 32 (Fig. 1).

Figure 1

The correlation of rCBF and the change-of-thirst score derived from 99 PET scans from 10 subjects during the experimental sequence. The sections are at x = −8, x = −2, and x = + 2 and show activations (red-yellow) and deactivations (blue-green). The color coding of Z scores is shown in the figure. The bilateral posterior cingulate activations are evident.

Subtraction Analysis of Maximum Thirst.

The salient change in the brain associated with the development of moderate-to-severe thirst (maximum thirst minus baseline) occurred predominantly in the cingulate gyrus (10 areas with Z score > 3.08, Figs. 2 and 3). There also were highly significant activations in parahippocampal, insula, and thalamic areas (Table 1 and Fig. 2). The cingulate areas involved anterior (Table 1) and two less strong activations in the posterior cingulate region, i.e., BA 29 (x = −4, y = −42, z = 20; cluster size 33, Z = 3.17; and x = −2, y = −44, z = 8; cluster size 51; Z = 3.11). There were also six foci in the midcingulate (y = −4 to y = −16). Overall, BA 24, 9, 32, and 29 were involved. Cingulate, amygdala, parahippocampus, thalamic, and two brainstem areas, one in the region of the paranigral pigmented and parabrachial nucleus (31) were contemporaneously highly significantly deactivated (Figs. 2 and 3). Maximum thirst was associated with parietal activation; the strongest focus was in the mouth region of the post-central gyrus and disappeared with wetting the mouth (Table 1, Fig. 2).

Figure 2

The volume (mm3) of the regional activations and deactivations observed in each brain region during maximum thirst, 5 min after wetting the mouth, 3 min after drinking to satiation, and 14 min after drinking to satiation are shown as a stacked bar graph. “Rest of limbic” refers collectively to the parahippocampal and insula cortex and amygdala and also includes the thalamus. The activation volumes were determined by adding all voxels with Z score >3.08 and deactivation by adding voxels with Z score <−3.08. MT, maximum thirst; WM, wet mouth; D + 3, 3 min after drinking water to satiation; D + 14, 14 minutes after drinking water to satiation.

Table 1

Changes in rCBF relative to resting PET scans

Figure 3

(Left) The PET activations (saggital section x = −2) of the average brain of the 10 subjects where initial resting non-thirsty state is compared with maximum thirst (Top), 5 min after wetting the mouth (Middle), and 3 min after drinking to satiation (Bottom). Only significant activations (Z > 1.96) and deactivations (Z < −1.96) are shown as per color bars. (The color coding of Z scores is shown on the figure.) (Right) Logical images formed by logical AND (cyan: present in both) of two activation statistical images, and logical NOT (red: present in first but not second) of the two activation images as indicated by arrows. Each logical image is formed from two statistical images as indicated by the arrows on the right of the statistical images.

Wetting the Mouth During Maximum Thirst.

Irrigating the mouth with water caused reduction of cingulate activation, although highly significant foci persisted in the anterior, mid-, and posterior cingulate (Table 1) (BA 24, 32, and 31), which disappeared immediately after drinking to satiation (Fig. 3; Table 1). Wetting the mouth caused a number of strong frontal activations to appear, particularly in BA 47 (Table 1). Also, deactivation foci appeared (Table 1), particularly in the posterior cingulate and parahippocampal regions (BA 31, 30, 19, 36).

Satiation of Thirst.

By 3 min after drinking water to satiation, the major activations in the cingulate had disappeared (Table 1, Fig. 3). However, by 14 min, a new highly significant activation had appeared in the mid-cingulate in BA 24 (x = −14, y = 4, z = 38; Z = 4.17) (Table 1).

Whereas with the criterion of significance employed no activation sites were detected in mesencephalon and diencephalon with maximum thirst, two highly significant activation foci had emerged 14 min after drinking to satiation, one in the midbrain in the periaqueductal gray (x = −6, y = −28, z = −4) and one in the pons (Table 1).

In addition to the primary contrasts described in the preceding paragraphs, secondary contrasts were created by applying logical operators (AND, OR, NOT) to pairs of the statistical images. The purpose of this analysis was to highlight activations unique to one state or common between two or more states. Fig. 3 reflects such a saggital section at x = −2. Anterior cingulate cortex activity persisted after wetting of the mouth, an overlap (cyan) occurred in BA 32, and the anterior cingulate activity returned to baseline levels after drinking to satiation (Fig. 3). Overall, maximum thirst was uniquely associated with diffuse activation of the limbic and paralimbic cortex (Table 1).

As an independent appraisal, these data were also analyzed by using SPM (Methods). The major brain activations with maximum thirst relative to baseline were bilateral in the anterior cingulate at BA 32 (Z = 3.21; Z = 2.77) at Talairach coordinates (x = −6, y = 34, z = 24) and (x = 12, y = 34, z = 4), respectively and at postcingulate (x = 14, y = −44, z = 8; Z = 2.75) (BA 29). An activation also was observed in the left lobus paracentralis at BA 31 (x = −10, y = −26, z = 44; Z = 2.18). After wetting the mouth, brain activations were again observed bilaterally in the anterior cingulate (Z = 2.79; Z = 3.13) at Talairach coordinates (x = −12, y = 34, z = 4 and x = 6, y = 14, z = 36), respectively. Activations also were observed in the medial right frontal cortex, BA 11 (x = 21, y = 40, z = 12; Z = 3.21). Three minutes after drinking to satiation, the medial anterior cingulate regions were no longer activated; instead, the major activations were observed in the right precentral gyrus at BA 6 (x = 42, y = 2, z = 28; Z = 3.59) in the right lateral posterior thalamus (x = 18, y = −22, z = 16; Z = 3.39;), and in the right superior temporal gyrus at BA 22 (x = 64, y = −34, z = 8; Z = 2.8). Fourteen minutes after drinking to satiation, a new strong activation in the left cingulate gyrus (x = −14, y = −4, z = 32; Z = 3.48) was observed.

A categorical subtraction analysis (100% infusion, + maximum thirst + wet mouth) compared to (rest 1, + rest 2, + satiation at +3 min, +14 min, +45 min, + 60 min) showed major effects in BA 32 and BA 24 (namely, x = 10, y = 24, z = 32; cluster size 114, Z = 3.15, and x = 0, y = 20, z = 32; Z = 2.61) for BA 32, and (x = 12, y = −10, z = 44; cluster size 35, Z = 2.74) for BA 24. Bilateral strong claustrum activation also occurred (x = 32, y = −20, z = 8; cluster size 57; Z = 3.26); and (x = −32, y = −14, z = 12; cluster size 37; Z = 2.82).

The changes in rCBF at the four strongest activations from this subtraction analysis show a progressive rise in rCBF during the infusion scans, with maximum value occurring with wet mouth, and an obvious decrease of rCBF occurred by 3 min after drinking to satiation. The final rCBF (scans 9 and 10) was equivalent to the initial (scans 1 and 2) (Fig. 4).

Figure 4

The mean rCBF for the 10 subjects at the location of the four strongest activations identified in the subtraction analysis involving the high state of thirst (100% infusion, maximum thirst, and wet mouth) compared with the six scans in which thirst was absent or minimal. The maximal rCBF was reached with the wet mouth scan, and a clear decrease of rCBF occurred 3 min after drinking water to satiation, and by 45 and 60 min, it had returned to the initial rCBF level.

The analysis with the two independent methods highlighted predominance of the cingulate as the site of the most robust activations.

DISCUSSION

General Biological Aspects.

Three results with biomedical importance emerge from this study. First, the genesis of a compelling consciousness of thirst involving a contemporaneous awareness of dryness of the mouth caused striking activation and inhibitory processes in phylogenetically ancient brain regions. The areas involved—parahippocampus, amygdala, and thalamus—are present in reptiles and amphibians (32). Together with cingulate areas and insula, the cortical elements include allocortex and transitional cortex that differ structurally from the isocortex characteristic of the association areas, which contain six more or less pronounced layers (3335). The five-layered cortex of the cingulate regions appears in the earliest mammals (36), but there are differing views (35, 37, 38) regarding the phylogeny of these limbic areas. Butler and Hodos (38) state that the current evidence indicates that the limbic system evolved long before the advent of any amniote vertebrates, let alone early mammals. Overall, the findings are consonant with the concept of thirst as a primitive vegetative function with much of its circuitry emergent early in vertebrate evolution.

Second, Bernard’s (39) experiments on copious drinking with an open esophageal fistula relegated “dry mouth” to a secondary role in thirst genesis. The data here showed reduction of activation foci with wetting of the mouth, not only in parietal sensory areas, but in the limbic system and particularly the cingulate foci. However, the data showed persistence of some cingulate foci after mouth wetting. The results support Cannon’s view (16) of the importance of dry mouth in thirst, but, like the open fistula experiment and the avid drinking in dehydrated ruminants that have continuous salivary secretion (27), they vitiate any notion of a dominant causal role.

Third, the consummatory act of rapid drinking was associated with contemporaneous loss of thirst and the major of the anterior and posterior cingulate activations within 3 min of completion. Characteristically, gratification occurred without any alteration in plasma [Na] or osmolality (27, 40). A new activation appeared caudally in the midcingulum 14 min after drinking to satiation (BA 24). A strong active focus appeared in the midbrain close to the aqueduct, which is of interest in the light of attested cingulate pathways to periaqueductal gray. Satiation also caused several strong limbic deactivations—mainly posterior cingulate, insula, and thalamic. Further experiments will be required to evaluate significance of these regions in the consciousness of gratification. The trio of sensory inflow from mouth, esophageal monitoring of volume swallowed, and gastric distension appears to be jointly sufficient and severally necessary to abolish thirst (27).

Paramount Role of the Limbic System.

The outstanding cerebral effect of significant thirst and dry mouth was a general functional change in the limbic system and entities involved in the Papez circuit (41). The term “limbic system” is used here as a loose construct to imply that limbic cortex and its primary brainstem connections constitute a system involving functional integration (35). Later studies have doubted the value of the concept of a limbic system and stressed the complexity of cortical connections of the hypothalamus (42, 43).

Significant thirst may be termed a primal compelling emotion. In terms of difference from some other emotional states, thirst, when severe, is relatively inaccessible to cognitive amelioration, in contrast to the situation to a variable degree with, for example, anger, hatred, love, sexual desire, territoriality, and fear. Underlying this putative dichotomy may be the fact that the latter emotions involve situational perceptions based on distance receptor input. Thirst, however, is interoceptor-driven and initiated through mechanisms in the phylogenetically ancient basal brain, as with hunger for air. The relative inaccessability of the primal emotion to higher cognitive amelioration may reside in this fundamental of brain organization.

The anterior cingulate receives extensive inputs from the remainder of the limbic system and other regions of the cerebral cortex, especially from areas frequently designated as associative (33, 34, 46, 47). In monkeys, BA 32 receives afferents from BA 9, the temporal pole, and the orbitofrontal cortex (47). The anterior cingulate was the site of activations correlating with change of plasma [Na] in these experiments (15) and some of the wide ranging connections of this region as described by Vogt and others (46, 47) were noted there. There is evidence that the anterior and posterior cingulate are functionally and anatomically coupled through an intracingulate neural network (46, 47). Whether the predominant correlation of the anterior cingulate foci with changes in plasma [Na] (15), and whether the posterior cingulate region with thirst reflects such a functional interconnection subserving genesis of thirst, awaits further investigation.

The posterior cingulate cortex is involved in processes underlying spatial memory and visual association areas, and somatosensory association areas send afferents to the posterior as well as anterior part of the cingulate cortex (34, 48). Afferents also come from the hippocampus (34, 46) and anterior thalamic nuclei. The subtraction studies in which the six low thirst score images were subtracted from conditions of highest thirst score (i.e., end of infusion, maximum thirst, and wet mouth) also showed major activations in the anterior and middle cingulate—BA 32 and BA 24. The bilateral activations also seen in the claustrum were interesting because, inter alia, it receives afferents from the hypothalamus and intralaminar nucleus of the dorsal thalamus (38). Some caution is noted in attributing this bilateral activation to the claustrum in light of its close proximity to the deep insula, which has involvement in salivation and mouth movement.

In relation to major effects in other lobes, the frontal activations (BA 47, 45, and 11) that appeared with wetting the mouth and disappeared with drinking to satiation were striking, and of particular interest in the light of the data of Rolls in monkeys showing there are neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex that respond to taste of water (49). Furthermore, the activity of these neurons was greatest when the monkeys were thirsty, whereas, following satiation, their firing reduced to baseline (49). In our experiments, the large frontal response to the wetting of the mouth while thirst persisted and the disappearance of this effect when the mouth was wet (but wet as a result of drinking water to satiation) was consistent with Rolls’ data. Clinical data does not suggest removal or damage of frontal lobes deranges thirst (33). Vascular lesions damaging the anterior cingulate cause mutism with or without akinesia (51), which are clinical conditions in which thirst derangement may not be evident without systematic study of blood chemistry.

Thalamic activations and deactivations were prominent in the experiment, and connections of the thalamus to the anterior and posterior cingulate, brain stem, hypothalamus, and amygdala are well established (50). The thalamus is a relay of sensory afferent inflow as would have occurred with the dry mouth. The left parahippocampus (BA 28), very strongly activated in maximum thirst, projects to the cingulate, and there is cingulate–parahippocampal continuity rounding the splenium of the corpus callosum.

Evolutionary Considerations.

In relation to current general discussion of the phylogenetic emergence of consciousness, Edelman (7) has proposed that it is the evolutionary development of the ability to create a scene that led to the emergence of primary consciousness. He says, “The word ‘scene’ is meant to convey the idea that responses to roughly contemporaneous events in the world are connected by a set of re-entrant processes… we experience primary consciousness as a ‘picture’ or ‘mental image’ of ongoing categorized events.” Alternate to this primarily distance receptor concept, a theory that has been advanced is that primary awareness might have emerged with the basic vegetative systems, and, accordingly, from interoceptor-initiated brain events (11). That is, the evolutionary origin might have come from sensations and primal emotions arising from sensors and receptors, both internal and surface, signaling that the existence of the creature was immediately threatened—for example, hunger for air, thirst, hunger, pain, and extreme temperature change (13). The basic vegetative systems have control centered in the phylogenetically ancient areas of the brain (mesencephalon and diencephalon), which is also the case with the elemental processes of arousal and of sleep. It is salient, however, to Edelman’s view that the optic tectum is a major anatomical feature in, e.g., the lamprey, alligator, shark, and pigeon. The optic tectum is the recipient of inflow from optic nerves, and in many fishes it is larger than the cerebral hemispheres (32).

The results in this study underscore that thirst is subserved by a complex distributed pattern of activation and deactivation, the functional changes being mainly in phylogenetically ancient brain areas. The data suggests that the anterior and posterior cingulate, as well as the anterior wall of the third ventricle, are major elements of a pattern including thalamic, hippocampal, orbitofrontal, insula, and midbrain sites that subserve the genesis of consciousness of thirst when plasma [Na] increases. A prototypical primal vegetative emotion like thirst is likely in humans to be evocative of memories of sources of fluid and of the pleasures of gratification, thus giving rise to a complex conscious experience, and this possibly might have contributed to some activity in association areas seen here. It is feasible the complex pattern of activations and deactivations found here represent a “dynamic core” (52) of functionally integrated, but anatomically distributed, processes subserving consciousness of thirst.

Acknowledgments

The authors appreciate discussion and bibliographic suggestion from Dr. Helen Mayberg, Dr. Fred Plum, Dr. John McKenzie, Professor Fred Mendelsohn, and Professor David Copolov. This work was supported by the Robert J. Jr. and Helen C. Kleberg Foundation, the G. Harold and Leila Y. Mathers Charitable Foundation, The Howard Florey Biomedical Foundation of the U.S., and the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia.

Footnotes

  • To whom reprint requests should be addressed. e-mail: d.denton@hfi.unimelb.edu.au.

  • ABBREVIATIONS:
    BA,
    Brodmann’s area;
    rCBF,
    regional cerebral blood flow;
    PET,
    positron emission tomography

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